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ARTICLES

FIRREA AND THE NEW FEDERAL HOME LOAN
BANK SYSTEM
Dirk S. Adams*
Rodney R. Peck**
Jill W. Spencer***

I.

INTRODUCTION

On August 9, 1989, President Bush signed into law the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act
(FIRREA).1 FIRREA dramatically altered the federal regulatory
scheme for the savings and loan industry. This landmark financial industry legislation also significantly changed the regulation of the Federal Home Loan Banks (Banks or Federal
Home Loan Bank System). This Article examines FIRREA's
impact on the Banks and their shareholders (members), both
key components of America's home finance system. Included
in this review is a discussion of the changes wrought in the
regulatory oversight of the Banks and their members, the modifications in the corporate governance and powers of the
* Dirk S. Adams is a Group Senior Vice President of World Savings and
Loan Association, Oakland, California. He was formerly Senior Vice President and
General Counsel of the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco.
** Rodney R. Peck is a partner of Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, San Francisco, California.
*** Jill W. Spencer is Senior Vice President and General Counsel of the
Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Benjamin M.
Vandegrift, Kenneth P. Christman, Jr. and Laura C. Patriarca of Pillsbury, Madison
& Sutro and Marirose K. Lescher, former Associate General Counsel, Federal
Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, in the preparation of this article.
1. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-73, 101 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2,
5, 12, 15, 26, 28, 31, 40, 42 & 44 U.S.C.).

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

Banks, and the principal challenges facing the Federal Home
Loan Bank System in the post-FIRREA environment.
The twelve district banks in the Federal Home Loan Bank
System were established by the Federal Home Loan Bank Act
of 1932 (FHLB Act). 2 The Banks each serve a specified geographical district and are presently headquartered in Boston,
New York, Pittsburgh, Atlanta, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, Chicago, Des Moines, Dallas, Topeka, San Francisco and Seattle. As
of September 30, 1990, the twelve Banks had combined total
assets of $159.7 billion, 3 combined outstanding loans (advances) to member institutions of $117.8 billion,4 outstanding capital market debt obligations (consolidated obligations) of $116.3
billion,5 and total equity capital, including reserves, of $11.8
billion.6
II.

A.

THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF BANK REGULATION

The FederalHome Loan Bank System Before FIRREA

The Banks are federally chartered, privately owned corporations.7 Before FIRREA, the Banks' two basic missions were
to: (1) provide wholesale banking services to member savings
and loan associations;' and (2) examine, supervise and regulate federally insured member institutions through Bank employees acting as agents of the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board (FHLBB or Bank Board) and the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC).9

2. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449 (1988). For additional information regarding the
development and basic elements of the Federal Home Loan Bank System, see
Dirk S. Adams & Rodney R. Peck, The Federal Home Loan Banks and the Home

Finance System, 43 BUs. LAW. 833 (1988). Unless otherwise noted herein, that
article's discussion of the Federal Home Loan Bank System's operations remains

valid. Id.
3. THE DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SAFER, MORE COMPETITIVE BANKS at XV-2 (1991) [hereinafter
TREASURY DEPARTMENT STUDY].

4. Id. at XV-3, tbl. 2.
5.

6.
7.
8.
sections
sections
9.

Id.

Id. at XV-2.
Id. at XV-1.
12 U.S.C. § 1431(e) (1988). Throughout this article all pre-FIRREA code
of 12 U.S.C. shall be designated as "former 12 U.S.C.," while current
shall be designated simply as "12 U.S.C."
Former

12 U.S.C. § 1437 (repealed

1989); see generally Adams & Peck,

supra note 2, at 837.(explaining the Banks' dual functions of banking and regula-
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Before FIRREA, the Banks were subject to regulatory
oversight by the Bank Board which, along with the FSLIC, was
an independent agency in the executive branch of the federal
government. ° In addition to overseeing the operation of the
twelve district Banks, the Bank Board granted federal charters
to savings and loan associations and certain savings banks,
and regulated all federally chartered thrift institutions. 2 The
FHLBB also managed the FSLIC, which in turn regulated all
FSLIC insured state-chartered savings institutions.'" Finally,
the FHLBB directed the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC).' 4
B. FIRREA s New Regulatory Structurefor the FederalHome Loan
Bank System
FIRREA abolished the FHLBB and, in its stead, established two new agencies.' 5 The Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS) is vested with the authority and responsibility for carrying out the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 (HOLA) with
respect to the examination, supervision and regulation of insured savings and loan associations. 6 Under FIRREA, the
OTS serves as the primary federal regulator for state and federal savings and loan associations and possesses the federal
chartering authority formerly vested in the FHLBB.' 7 OTS is
designated as a bureau in the Department of the Treasury,
"subject to the general oversight of the Secretary of the Treasury. "?1 FIRREA also established the position of the Director
of the OTS and specified that "[t]he Secretary of the Treasury
may not intervene in any matter or proceeding before the Di-

tion).
10.

Former 12 U.S.C. § 1437(b) (repealed 1989).

11.

See id. § 1464(a) (amended 1989).

12.
13.

See id. § 1464(a), (d) (amended 1989).
Adams & Peck, supra note 2, at 836, 843.

14.

Former 12 U.S.C. § 1452(a) (amended 1989). FIRREA amended the FHLB

Act to provide that the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation be governed

by an 18 member board of directors under the regulatory oversight of the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. Id. § 1452. In effect, FIRREA completed
the privatization of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. Id.
15. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1422a, 1462a(a) (1988).
16. Id. §§ 1461, 146 2a(a), (e).
17. Id. §§ 1463-1464.
18. Id. § 1462a(b)(1).
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rector unless otherwise provided by law."' 9 The Director is
operation of
charged with providing for the safe and sound
20
associations.
loan
and
savings
insured
federally
The second new agency created by FIRREA is the Federal
Housing Finance Board (FHFB or Housing Finance Board).
Like the FHLBB, the FHFB was established as an independent21
agency in the executive branch of the federal government.
The FHFB is charged with the duty of supervising the Banks to
ensure that they "carry out their housing finance mission,...
remain adequately capitalized and able to raise funds in the
capital markets," and operate safely and soundly. 22 In these
respects, the FHFB succeeds to the authority of the FHLBB
with respect to the Banks.23
Management of the FHFB is vested in a five-member
board of directors which includes the Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD). 24 The other four directors
must be citizens of the United States, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. 25 ' Except for the first appointment, appointed directors serve staggered terms of seven
years. 26 Appointed directors must have "extensive experience

19. Id. § 1462a(b)(3).
20. Id.§ 1463(a).
21. Id. § 1422a(a)(2). In the original bill sent to Congress by the Bush Administration, the Banks would have been regulated by the Secretary of the' Treasury. S. 413, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), 135 CONG. REc. S1535 (1989). Congress rejected this approach, in part because in the past the Department of the
Treasury has opposed allocating credit to housing through government cooperatives.
22. 12 U.S.C. § 1422a(a)(3) (1988).
23. Id. § 1422a(a)(1). The nature of the FHLBB's authority over the Banks is,
therefore, suggestive. In that regard, a federal appellate court found the authority
of the FHLBB over the Banks to be "sweeping and plenary" and the "broadest
kind of federal control" derived from the Banks' status as "federal
instrumentalit[ies]" organized to "carry out public policy" with functions which are
wholly governmental in nature. Fahey v. O'Melveny & Myers, 200 F.2d 420, 443,
446 (9th Cir. 1952).
24. 12 U.S.C. § 1422a(b)(I), (3) (1988).
25. Id. § 1422a(b)(1)(B).
26. Id. § 1422a(b)(1)(B), (b)(3). Following the enactment of FIRREA, controversy surrounding whether the FHFB directors would serve in full-time or
part-time positions delayed confirmation of the President's appointments to the
Housing Finance Board. The FHFB directors were finally confirmed by the Senate
in February 1992 after an agreement was reached with the Administration that the
directors would hold part-time positions through 1993, at which time the positions
would become full-time. AM. BANKER, Mar. 2, 1992, at 10.
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or training in housing finance or [have] a commitment to providing specialized housing credit."2 7 At least one director
must "be chosen from an organization with more than a 2-year
history of representing consumer or community interests [in
respect of] banking services, credit needs, housing or financial
consumer protection."2 8 "Not more than 3 directors [may] be
members of the same political party." 29 The President shall
designate one of the appointed directors as chairperson of the
FHFB.30 Until such time as at least two directors are appointed and confirmed to the FHFB, the Secretary of HUD
shall act for all purposes and with full powers of the board of
directors of the FHFB.3 '
FIRREA also made substantial changes in the federal deposit insurance system.32 The Act abolished the FSLIC,33
created the FSLIC Resolution Fund to assume the outstanding
nondeposit insurance obligations of FSLIC and established a
new insurance fund, known as the Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF), to insure the deposits of savings and loan
associations. 4 Commercial banks and savings banks formerly
insured by the FDIC will be insured by the new Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) to which the assets and liabilities of the FDIC
fund were transferred3 M All three funds are administered by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). 6 The
Board of Directors of the FDIC was restructured to consist of
five members, including the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Director of the OTS and three individuals appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate. 37

27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

31.

Id. § 1422a(c).

§
§
§
§

1422a(b)(2)(A).
1422a(b)(2)(B).
1422a(b)(2)(A).
1422a(c)(1).

32. Paul T. Clark et al., Regulation of Savings Associations Under the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovety, and Enfoirement Act of 1990, 45 Bus. LAW. 1013 (1990).
33. Former 12 U.S.C. § 1437 (repealed 1989).
34. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821a, 1821(a)(6) (1989).
35. Id. § 1821(a)(5).
36. Id. § 1821(aX6).
37. Id. § 1812(a).
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C. Oversight of the Banks
The FHFB, vested with the authority to supervise and regulate the Banks, may promulgate and enforce regulations and
orders to carry out the provisions of the FHLB Act." The
FHFB is also authorized to engage and compensate employees,
attorneys and agents and to suspend or remove, for cause, a
director, officer, employee or agent of any Bank."0 The FHFB
may not delegate any of its nonministerial functions to employees, joint offices or administrative units of the Banks.4"
In implementing its regulatory oversight authority over
the Banks, the FHFB adopted the former FHLBB regulations
at 12 C.F.R. pts. 506, 506a and 521-535 as the new regulations
of the FHFB, now found at 12 C.F.R. pt. 910."' As before
FIRREA, the Banks must obtain the approval of their regulatory agency to select, appoint and compensate officers and employees,4 2 acquire offices and properties," declare dividends,44 undertake certain borrowing activities,45 establish capital and operating budgets4 6 and promulgate credit policies.47 The FHFB also prescribes procedures to be followed
by the Banks in the collection and settlement of checks, drafts
or other negotiable or non- negotiable items, or instruments of

38.
39.
40.

Id. §§ 1422a, 1422b.
Id. § 1422b(a)(2).
Id. § 1422b(b)(l). Prior to FIRREA, the Bank Board had delegated to the

Bank presidents (known as principal supervisory agents) and to individual em-

ployees of the Banks (known as supervisory agents and examiners), but not to the
Banks themselves, the authority to supervise and examine FSLIC-insured thrifts. See
former 12 C.F.R. §§ 500.32(b), 501.10, 501.11, 561.16c (repealed 1989). While performing these delegated functions, Bank employees acted as agents of the FHLBB

and the FSLIC and not as agents of the Bank. Neither the Banks nor their
directors had any responsibility or liability for monitoring or supervising Bank
employees performing these functions. See former 12 C.F.R. § 522.62 (repealed
1989). It has been held that the Banks are not liable for actions taken by their
employees in their capacity as supervisory agents. Saratoga Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 724 F. Supp. 683, 685 (N.D. Cal. 1989). In addition, prior
to FIRREA, other Offices of the Banks performed certain specific functions on
behalf of the FHLBB, as for example, the Office of Education.

Fed. Reg. 36,757 (1989).
U.S.C. § 1432(a) (1991); 12 C.F.R. § 932.41 (1990).
U.S.C. § 1432(a) (1988)
C.F.R. § 932.3 (1990).

41.
42.
43.
44.

54
12
12
12

45.
46.

12 U.S.C. § 1431(a)-(c) (1991).
12 C.F.R. § 934.6 (1990).

47.

Id. §§ 935.2, 940.1.
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payment drawn on or issued by members or institutions eligible to become Bank members.48 Following FIRREA, the
Banks' boards of directors may now provide for indemnification of their officers and directors without FHFB approval,49
in contrast to prior law under which the Bank Board could
prevent Banks from providing such indemnification."
D. Resolution of Thrift Cases
The essential purpose of FIRREA is to provide a structure
for resolving the huge number of troubled thrift cases which
continued to confront the federal government in 1989.
FIRREA was necessary because the government's first attempt
to resolve the thrift crisis through recapitalization of the FSLIC
under the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987
(CEBA)5" had been unsuccessful in stemming the tide of
thrift insolvencies. Under both CEBA and FIRREA, Congress
established a major funding role for the Banks in the resolution of this most serious financial services crisis since the Great
Depression.
The FSLIC Recapitalization Act of 1987, enacted as part
of the CEBA, established the Financing Corporation
(FICO),52 the purpose of which was to borrow up to $10.825
billion in the public capital markets to transfer to the then
insolvent FSLIC.5" Such funds were transferred to the FSLIC
in exchange, in part, for FICO receiving nonvoting capital
stock in the FSLIC, and, in part, for FICO receiving nonredeemable capital certificates issued by the FSLIC.54 FICO was
to be capitalized by funds of the Banks which were to be used
to purchase zero coupon bonds to defease the principal of the
obligations issued by FICO.55 The Banks were also responsible for the payment of the administrative expenses of FICO.5 6
Under CEBA, funds for the interest payments on FICO obliga-

48.

Id. § 943.1.

49.

12 U.S.C. § 1427(k) (1988).

50.

Id.

51. Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (1987).
52. 12 U.S.C. § 1441(c), (e) (1988).
53. Id.
54. Id. § 1441(c), (e)(3).
-55.

56.

4 4

Id. § 1

2

1(g)( ).

Id. § 1441(b)(7)(A).
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tions and the payment of FICO's nonadministrative expenses
insurance assessments against
came primarily from deposit
57
FSLIC-insured institutions.
After FIRREA, the bulk of the assets and nondeposit insurance liabilities of the now defunct FSLIC were transferred
to the newly created FSLIC Resolution Fund.5" The transferred assets and liabilities arose, in large part, from the
FSLIC's claims as deposit insurer against the assets of failed
thrifts. Pursuant to FIRREA, FICO (and thus, indirectly, the
Banks) continues to be one of the sources of funding for the
FSLIC Resolution Fund. 59 However, at the request of the
Treasury Department, FICO has not issued any obligations or
transferred to the FSLIC Resolution Fund any proceeds since
September 1989.60 Instead, the earnings of the Banks are being used to capitalize another thrift resolution mechanism established by FIRREA, the Resolution Funding Corporation
(REFCO). 6' It is unlikely that FICO will issue any future obligations because the repayment sources have been committed
elsewhere by FIRREA.
The enactment of FIRREA made clear that the $600 million in capital transferred from the Banks to FICO for principal defeasance represented an investment which will not be
returned to the Banks. Formerly, FICO was to terminate upon
the redemption by the FSLIC of its stock held by FICO or on
December 31, 2026, whichever was earlier.6 2 Because of the
abolition of the FSLIC and, thus, the elimination of the requirement that the FSLIC redeem its stock held by FICO,
FICO is now to dissolve, as soon as practicable, either when it
fully repays its outstanding obligations or on December 31,
2026.63 Accordingly, the Banks (which until FIRREA reflected
their FICO capital stock investment as a debit in the capital
section of their balance sheets) have written off their investment in FICO stock. 4
57.

Id. § 1441(0.

58.
59.

Id. § 1821a(a)(2)(A).
Id. § 1821a(b)(2), (3).

60.

Letter from K. Diane Boyle, Secretary/Treasurer, Financing Corporation,

to Stanley J. Poling, Interim Director, Division of FSLIC Operations, FDIC (Nov.
17, 1989) (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
61. 12 U.S.C. § 1441b(e) (1988).
62. Id. § 14410)(1).
63. Id. § 1441(i)(1).
64. Report of Deloitte, Haskins-Sells to Ronald R. Morphew, President, Feder-
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FIRREA modified the CEBA provisions regarding the payment of interest on FICO obligations to explicitly identify the
sources of funds for such interest payments. After FIRREA,
the first source of such funds is insurance premiums assessed
against SAIF-insured institutions, with FICO having first priority on the use of such insurance premiums.6 5 However, due to
the contraction of the thrift industry, and the corresponding
decrease in the amount of SAIF insurance premiums collected,
the amount of insurance premium funds available for interest
payments.on FICO obligations may continue to decline.66 To
the extent insurance premium assessments are insufficient to
meet interest payments, FICO may request that the FDIC
transfer to FICO the amount of liquidating dividends and payments made on receivership claims received by the FSLIC Resolution Fund, provided that such funds are not needed by the
REFCO.6 7 As of this writing, no such funds- have been made
available for FICO interest payments.
In addition to those funds it may receive from FICO, the
FSLIC Resolution Fund receives other funds from income
earned on the Resolution Fund's assets, liquidating dividends
and receivership claims (to the extent such funds are not needed by FICO and REFCO), and, from August 9, 1989 until December 31, 1991, SAIF insurance premiums (to the extent such
funds are not needed by FICO and REFCO).68 From August
9, 1989 to September 30, 1991, the FSLIC Resolution Fund is
responsible for the payment of the administrative expenses of
SAIF.69 (This administrative obligation may account for the
third priority standing of the FSLIC Resolution Fund in the
use of SAIF insurance premiums.)70
To the extent that these identified sources of funds are
insufficient to cover commitments of the FSLIC Resolution
Fund, the Department of Treasury is authorized to provide,

al Home Loan Bank of Indianapolis (June 30, 1989).

65.
66.
1991).
67.

12 U.S.C. § 1441(0 (1988).
See Thrift s Deposit Shrinkage Continued in May, AM. BANKER 10 (August 2,
12 U.S.C. §§ 1441(f)(3),

(1989).
68. Id. § 1821a(b)(4).
69. Id. § 18 21a (6)(D).
70. Id.

1821a(6)(D) (1991);

12 C.F.R. § 950.12(b)(2)
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subject to appropriation by Congress, unlimited funds to the
FSLIC Resolution Fund.7'
FIRREA also established the Resolution Trust Corporation
(RTC) which is, for the most part, funded by REFCO, and
managed by the chief executive officer of the RTC.72 Both
REFCO and the RTC are, in turn, governed by the Thrift Depositor Protection. Oversight Board.7" The Thrift Depositor
Protection Oversight Board consists of the Secretary of the
Treasury who serves as Chairman, the Chairman of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Director of
the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the
Chief Executive Officer of the RTC, and two individuals of
different political parties, appointed by the President.74
The RTC's mission is to resolve the troubled thrift cases
placed in receivership between January 1, 1989 and August 9,
1992, three years after the enactment of FIRREA.75 The RTC
must also reevaluate all resolution cases undertaken by the
FSLIC between January 1, 1988 and August 9, 1989.76 The
RTC will exist until December 31, 1996, and its funding will
consist of $50 billion, the majority of which will be raised by
and transferred from REFCO over a three-year period beginning on the date of FIRREA's enactment.7 7 One of the most
debated issues during the drafting of FIRREA was whether the
capitalization of the RTC would be achieved through
on-budget direct Treasury financing, or off-budget financing
through REFCO. 7 s In the end, a compromise was struck

71. Id. § 182la(C). For fiscal year 1990, Congress appropriated "such sums as
may be necessary" under the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and
Urban Development, and the Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990.
Pub. L. No. 101-144, 103 Stat. 839, 868 (1989).
72. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(1)(C) (1991), amended by Pub. L. No. 102-233,
§309(a), 105 Stat. 1761, 1769 (1991).
73. Id. §§ 1441a(a); 1441b(c)(1), (8), amended by Pub. L. No. 102-233, § 302,
105 Stat. 1761, 1767 (1991); § 1441 a(b)(1)(c) (1991), amended by Pub. L. No.
102-233, § 309, 105 Stat. 1761, 1769 (1991).
74. Id. § 1441a(a)(3), amended by Pub. L. No. 102-233, § 304, 105 Stat. 1761,
1767 (1991).
75. Id. § 144la(b)(3)(A).
76. Id. § 1441a(b)(11)(B).
77. Id. §§ 1441a(b)(14)(A), (0), 1441b(e)(8), (f)(1), (4).
78. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REC. S3997 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1989), 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. (remarks of Senator Riegle); id. at S3999 (remarks of Senator Carn); id.
at S4006 (remarks of Senator Bryan); id. at S4008-4009 (reprinting various editori-
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whereby $18.8 billion from the Treasury, together with another $1.2 billion from the Banks, was transferred directly to the
RTC. 79 The remaining $30 billion of RTC capital is to be
raised by REFCO by borrowing in the public capital markets.8 °
The structure of REFCO is similar to FICO in that it is
administered by a three-person directorate comprised of the
director of the Office of Finance of the Federal Home Loan
Bank System and two Bank Presidents, to be selected by the
Oversight Board.8 ' The directorate -has little discretionary authority as nearly all of its actions require the approval of the
Thrift Depositor Protection Oversight Board. 2
Similar to FICO borrowing, REFCO borrowing is to be
defeased through the purchase of zero-coupon bonds which
are to be purchased with funds contributed by the Banks from
their aggregate retained earnings remaining after their initial
contribution to REFCO (approximately $900 million) and annual contributions of up to $300 million" (less any Bank contributions to FICO) from aggregate current earnings. In addition, insurance premiums assessed against SAIF-insured institutions, provided that such funds are not needed by FICO, will
also be used to defease REFCO borrowings.84 To the extent
these insurance assessments together with Bank earnings are
not sufficient to defease REFCO debt, the FDIC is to transfer
funds to REFCO from the liquidating dividends and payments
made on claims received by the FSLIC Resolution Fund from
85
receiverships.

als in issue). See also id. at H4976 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989) (remarks of Congressman LaFalce); id. at 1-14979 (remarks of Congressman Leach); id. at H4988-89
(remarks of Congressman Hall); id. at H4997-98 (remarks of Congressman
Fauntroy); id. at H4998 (remarks of Congresswoman Oaksar); id. at H5001 (remarks of Congressman Gonzales); see also id. at S10,182-83 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989

pt. II) (remarks of Senator Garn); id. at S10,189 (remarks of Senator Exon and
Senator Grassley).
79. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1441a(b)(14), 1441b(e)(8) (1991).
80.
81.

Id. § 1441(b)(f)(1).
Id. § 1441b(c)(1).

82.

12 C.F.R. §§ 1510.3-1510.12 (1989).

83. Each Bank's share of the $300 million annual contribution is determined
pursuant to a formula described at 12 U.S.C. § 1441b(e) (1991).

84.
85.

Id. § 1441b(e)(]), (e)(7)(A), (B).
Id. § 1441b(e)(7)(B).
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FIRREA provided that the payment of interest on REFCO
obligations will come from several sources. Those sources are:
(1) earnings on REFCO assets; (2) RTC liquidating dividends
and receivership proceeds, as well as payments on any warrants
received by the RTC in connection with the resolution of thrift
cases to the extent the Oversight Board determines such funds
are not needed by the RTC; (3) the balance, if any, of the
Banks' $300 million annual contribution which is not required
for defeasance of REFCO bonds; and (4) proceeds received by
the FSLIC Resolution Fund from the RTC's sale of the assets
of failed thrifts. To the extent these funds are insufficient to
cover the interest obligation on REFCO debt, the Treasury is
required to make up the shortfall. Any such payment by the
Treasury, however, will be considered a liability of REFCO to
be repaid to the Treasury from any remaining assets after liquidation of REFCO."6 Unlike FICO, which is statutorily limited to issuances of debt with a maturity no longer than thirty
years, REFCO is not so limited. 7
It appears that these contributions to REFCO will substantially reduce the Banks' net income, and, as a result of the adverse effect on the Banks' ability to pay dividends to members,
the thrift industry's net income will decline as well. In recent
years, the Banks have paid approximately seventy-five to eighty
percent of their net income to members in the form of dividends on member Bank stock." Since such dividend income
constituted an estimated thirty-five to forty-five percent of the
net profits of solvent savings and loan associations, the industry at large will undoubtedly feel the effects of this decrease in
dividend income. 9 As one Federal Home Loan Bank official
testified:
Obviously, [Federal Home Loan Bank] dividends will be
significantly lowered over the next four or five years. Simulations suggest a reduction of about 25%-30%. That reduc-

86. Id. § 1441b(O(2)(E)(ii).
87. Id. §§ 1441(e)(3), 1441b(o.
88. Ovetsight Heaing to Examine the Impact of FIRREA on the Federal Home
Loan Bank System: Heaings Before the Subcommittee on General Oversight and Investigation, House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affaits, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
99 (1989) (staternent of Mr. Barney Beeksmna, Chairman of the United States
League of Savings Institutions).
89. Id. at 33-34 (1989) (statement of Mr. David Sullivan, Chairman, National
Council of Savings Institutions).
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tion will deleteriously impact our stockholders, the nation's
thrifts, who rely on those payments as an important source
of their income. The legislation imposes many other burdens on the thrift industry as well. The outcome is likely to
be considerable shrinkage of the thrift industry-our members and customers-and therefore, the Banks themselves.
Let me be clear; none of our simulations show us operating at a loss, and, therefore, I can see no loss of interest or
principal by our [Bank] bondholders.'

E.

CorporateStructure of the Banks After FIRREA

As before FIRREA, the management of each Bank is vested in a board of fourteen directors, eight of whom are elected
by its member institutions with the remaining six directors
appointed by the FHFB. 9" At least two of the six FHFB- appointed directors must be consumer representatives chosen
from organizations with more than a two-year history of "representing consumer or community interests on banking services, credit needs, housing, or financial consumer protection."9 2
As before FIRREA, each elective directorship is to be designated by the FHFB as representing Bank members of a particular state, and only persons who reside in the district and who
are officers or directors of a member located in that state are
eligible to become directors." Appointed directors may not
have a financial interest in or serve as an officer or director of
a member institution.9 4 Elected directors serve for a two-year
term and may be elected to three consecutive terms. 95 Appointed directors serve for four years.96
Under the FHLB Act, as amended by FIRREA, no person
who is an officer or director of a member that fails to meet

90. Government-Sponsored Enteiprises: Heaings Before the Subcommittee on General
Oveisight of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 78
(1989) (statement of Mr. Brian Dittenhafer, President of Federal Home Loan Bank
of New York).

91. 12 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1991).
92. Id. Note that similar qualifications are required for one of the five members of the FHFB. See supra text accompanying note 28.

93. 12 U.S.C. § 1427(b) (1991).
94.
95.
96.

Id. § 1427(a).
Id. § 1427(d).
Id.
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any applicable capital requirement is eligible to hold the office
of director of a Bank.97 In the event of such a disqualification
of an elected director, the vacancy is to be filled by an affirmative vote of the majority of the remaining Bank directors, regardless of whether they constitute a quorum.98 In the event
of a vacancy in any appointive directorship, the vacancy is to
be filled through appointment by the FHFB for the unexpired
term.

9

F. Membership in the Banks
The FHLB Act, as amended by FIRREA, provides that any
building and loan association, savings and loan, cooperative
bank, homestead association, insurance company, savings bank
or any insured depository institution (including a commercial
bank)... and any insured credit union, is eligible to become a
member of a Bank if: (1) the prospective member is duly orga-

nized under the laws of any state or the United States; (2) it is
subject to inspection and regulation under the banking or
similar laws of the state or the United States; and (3) it makes
such home mortgage loans that in the judgment of the FHFB
are long- term loans.'
An insured depository institution
which was not a member of a Bank on January 1, 1989, may
become a member only if: (1) the institution has at least ten
percent of its total assets in residential mortgage loans; (2) its
financial condition is such that advances may be safely made to
it by the Bank; and (3) the character of its management and
home financing policy are consistent with sound and economical home financing." 2 An insured depository institution commencing operations after January 1, 1989, may become a member of a Bank if it complies with regulations and orders prescribed by the FHFB pertaining to the ten percent asset requirement within one year after commencement of its operations.103

97. Id. § 1427(b).
98. Id. § 1427(0(3).
99. Id. § 1427(0(2).
100. See id. § 1813(c)(2) for definition of "insured depository institution."
101. Id. § 1424(a).
102. Id. § 1424(a)(2).
103. Id. § 1424. To date, no regulations on this subject have been promulgated by the FFIFB.
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With the inclusion of "any insured depository institution"
in the FHLB Act, FIRREA made commercial banks and credit
04
unions eligible, for the first time, for Bank membership.
At December 31, 1988, approximately 2,300 credit unions and
8,000 commercial banks were eligible for Bank membership.0 5 By July of 1991, some 250 commercial banks had
joined the Federal Home Loan Bank System.' 0 6
As before FIRREA, federal savings and loan associations
are required by law to be Bank members.' 7 Before FIRREA,
some state-chartered thrifts were required to become Bank
members as a contractual condition for FSLIC insurance of
accounts; FIRREA did not amend the FHLB Act with respect
to Bank membership8 requirements for state-chartered SAIF0
insured institutions.'
As before FIRREA, Bank members continue to be subject
to an initial minimum mandatory stock purchase requirement
in an amount equivalent to one percent of the aggregate unpaid principal of the member's home mortgage loans, home
purchase contracts and other similar obligations.0 9 Bank
members must also continue to hold Bank stock equal to at
least five percent of their outstanding advances." 0 FIRREA
modified the initial minimum stock purchase requirement by
specifying that members in a Bank must acquire Bank stock in
the amount they would be required to purchase if at least thirty percent of their assets consisted of home mortgage
loans."' However, a member with more than thirty percent
104. To offset some of the drain on the Banks' retained earnings as a result
of FIRREA-mandated contributions to FICO and REFCO, Congress decided to
broaden the Banks' potential membership base and thus, their capital base. H.R.

CONF. REP. No. 222, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 425 (1989).
105. Ovesight Hearing to Examine the Impact of FIRREA on the Federal Home
Loan Bank System: Hearings Before the Subconmitee on General Ove~sight and Investigations, House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affais, 101st Cong., ist Sess.
73-74 (1989) (statement of "'hurnian Connell, President of the Federal lone Loan
Bank of Des Moines). See also Mary K. Bush, Managing Director, Federal Housing
Finance Board, Address Before the National Press Club Morning Newsmakers July

18, 1990).
106. FHFB Proposes Changes to Director Requirements; 250th Bank Joins System,
BNA BANKING DAILY (Washington, D.C.), July 24, 1991.
107. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(f) (amended 1991).
108. For a discussion of voluntar'y membership and deterioration of the Banks'
capital position see infra text accompanying notes 178-82.
109. 12 U.S.C. § 1426(b) (1991).

110. Id. § 1426(b)(2).
111.

d. § 1430(e)(3). The 0.3% of total assets stock purchase requirement re-
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of its assets in home mortgage loans would still be required to
purchase stock in an amount equivalent to one percent of the
member's actual home mortgage loans. The effect of the three
provisions is to establish a new minimum stock purchase requirement which is the greater of 0.3% of total assets, one percent of mortgage loans or five percent of advances.
Under prior law, an institution withdrawing from Bank
membership was ineligible to rejoin for five years." 12 As a result of FIRREA, withdrawing members will remain ineligible
for ten years." 3 Other FIRREA changes require that if an institution terminates its Bank membership, the indebtedness of
the member to the Bank must be liquidated in an orderly manner, as determined by the Bank, and, upon completion of the
liquidation, the stock in the Bank owned by the member must
be surrendered and cancelled." 4 Any such liquidation shall
be deemed a prepayment of indebtedness and shall be subject
to applicable prepayment fees as provided for in the credit
program of the Bank." 5
G. Credit Activities of the Bank After FIRREA
As before FIRREA, the primary mission of the Banks is
"to provide a reliable source of credit" for their members" 6
whose primary purpose is economical home finance. Each
Bank is authorized to make advances to its members, so long
as such advances are, in the judgment of the Bank, "fully secured.""..7 Although prior to the enactment of FIRREA the
Banks were authorized to grant a moderate amount of advances without security,"' FIRREA amended the FHLB Act
to eliminate the Banks' discretionary power by requiring that
all Bank advances be secured." 9

flects a compromise between those interests that wanted minimal Bank member-

ship eligibility requirements for commercial banks and credit unions and other
interests which believed that access to the Banks should be conditioned on a
significant commitment to housing finance.

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

12 U.S.C.A. § 1426(m) (1989).
Id. § 1426(h).
Id. § 1426(e).
Id.
12 C.F.R. § 940.1(a) (1990).
12 U.S.C. § 1430(a) (1991).
Former 12 U.S.C. § 143 1(g) (repealed 1989).
12 U.S.C. § 1430(a) (1991).
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Credit is granted pursuant to the terms of a Bank's credit
policy, which, consistent with pre-FIRREA rules, is established
by each Bank's board of directors within the parameters set by
the relevant statute and the FHFB.1 ° A Bank's board of directors is charged with administering its credit policy in a fair
and equitable manner, and the board of directors may extend
credit only if it can be done "safely and reasonably with due
regard" for the claims and demands of other institutions and
for "the maintenance of adequate credit standing for the
[Bank] and its obligations."' 2 ' The first standard that credit
must be managed so that it is available for all eligible members
is somewhat unusual. By comparison, commercial banks are
not required to consider the loan requests of all customers
when making lending decisions with respect to a particular
borrower. This standard was imposed at a time when federal
corporate entities were established as cooperatives and may
reflect 2the -original FHLB Act drafters' pro-cooperative philosophy.

12

Consistent with its statutory mandate, each Bank's credit
13
program must protect the financial integrity of the Bank.
Accordingly, interest rates on advances must be set "within a
range of rates ...

that is above the current replacement cost

of [consolidated Bank] obligations of comparable maturity, , 124 and "prepayment and commitment fees" are generally
25
required to protect the Bank from undue interest-rate risk.
Although members may generally use advances for any
authorized business purpose, e.g., "making residential mortgage, consumer and commercial loans, covering savings withdrawals, accommodating seasonal cash needs, restructuring
liabilities, and maintaining adequate liquidity, " 1 in a change
made by FIRREA, long-term advances may only be used for
housing finance purposes. 127 Advances may be made for periods of up to twenty years.' 2' Further, members that do not

120.
121.

12 C.F.R. § 935.2 (1990).
12 U.S.C. § 1427(j) (1991).

122.

THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

12
12
Id.
Id.
12
12

147-49 (1984).

U.S.C. § 1427(j) (1991); 12 C.F.R. § 940.1(a) (1990).
C.F.R. § 940.1(b) (1990).
§ 940.1(c).
U.S.C. § 1430(a) (1991).
C.F.R. § 940.1(b) (1990).
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meet the "qualified thrift lender" criteria may only apply for
advances to support a housing finance purpose, 2 9 regardless
of term.
As was the case prior to FIRREA, each Bank continues to
have broad discretion to deny an application for credit.'
"Advances may be limited or denied if a member engages in
unsafe or unsound practices, has inadequate regulatory capital,
is sustaining operating losses, or has other financial or managerial deficiencies ....
H.

Collateral Requirements

FIRREA eliminated the broad authority which was formerly vested in the Bank Board to prescribe the types of eligible
collateral for Bank advances pursuant to regulations. 132
FIRREA amended the FHLB Act to provide that eligible collateral shall consist of property falling only within the following
categories: (1) whole first mortgages on improved residential
property; (2) government securities; (3) deposits at a Bank; or
(4) other real estate related collateral, provided that the aggregate amount of advances secured by such other real estate
related collateral does not exceed thirty percent of the borrowing member's capital.' 3 As before FIRREA, each
member's Bank stock continues to be subject to a statutory
lien as further security for all indebtedness of the member to
34
the Bank.

FIRREA also eliminated FSLIC receivership claims from
the categories of eligible collateral, as formerly prescribed by
regulation by the FHLBB.' 3 5 Although in obvious conflict
with the new statute, these former FHLBB regulations were
carried forward by the Housing Finance Board when it adopted the former FHLBB regulations. 3 6 Presumably, the FSLIC

129.

12 U.S.C. § 1430(e)(1) (1991).

130. Id. § 1429; see Fidelity Fin. Corp. v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 792 F.2d
1432 (9th Cir. 1986).
131. 12 C.F.R. § 940.1(d) (1990).
132.

See former 12 U.S.C. § 1430(a) (repealed

1989).

133. 12 U.S.C. § 1430(a) (1991).
134. Id. § 1430(c).
135. Former 12 C.F.R. § 525.7(b) (repealed 1989).
136. 12 C.F.R. § 935.7 (1990).

1992]

FIRREA & FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANKS

35

receivership claims provision will be eliminated when the
Housing Finance Board adopts new collateral regulations.
These changes in the law governing eligible collateral advances presumably were intended to ensure that the Banks are
adequately protected against credit risk, and to prevent a recurrence of the situation which affected the Dallas Federal
Home Loan Bank with respect to loans secured by FSLIC obligations. In 1988 and 1989, at the urging of the FHLBB, the
Dallas Bank granted significant amounts of advances to members, which advances were collateralized by FSLIC notes and
future cash flows from FSLIC assistance agreements arising out
of Southwest Plan transactions.137 These advances exceeded
the capital of the Dallas Bank by a substantial amount.13 8 Because the ability of these thrift members to repay their advances was dependent on the ability of an insolvent FSLIC to honor its assistance agreements, the Banks' independent accountants determined that such repayment was uncertain and that
the uncertainty could significantly affect the financial condition
of the Dallas Bank.'3 9 The accountants further determined,
and noted in each Bank's 1988 Annual Report, that because of
the joint and several nature of the Banks' consolidated obligations, the potential inability of the Dallas Bank to repay its
could result in addiparticipation in consolidated obligations
4°
tional liability to the other Banks.
FIRREA attempted to address this problem in two ways.
First, the legislation restructured the Bank System by removing
the insurer of thrift institutions from regulatory control over
the Banks, thereby reducing the temptation for the Banks'
regulator to exert pressure on the Banks to make questionable
advances to their member institutions. Second, FIRREA

137. The F1HLBB created a 1988 progran for the expeditious consolidation of
several failed thrifts located primarily in Texas which became known as the
"Southwest Plan." FHLBB Officially Launches Southwest Plan; Consolidates Thrifts in
Houston, Dallas, BNA Banking Daily, May 23, 1988, at 7.
138. See Notes to Financial Statements, 1988 FHLB ANN. REP. 13.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., Independent Auditors' Opinion, 1988 FHLB ANN. REP. In the past,
the Banks have generally all been audited by the same national accounting firm.
The firm has been selected by the FHLBB in the past, and presumably will be
selected by the FHFB in the future, for the purpose of discharging the statutory
requirement of an annual "examination . . . and report . . . of condition of all
the Federal Home Loan Banks." 12 U.S.C. § 1440 (1991).
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amended the FHLB Act to eliminate FSLIC obligations as
eligible collateral for advances granted after enactment of the
legislation 4 ' and to require any member with advances "secured.by . .. insufficient eligible collateral [such as FSLIC obli-

gations to] reduce its level of outstanding advances promptly
14 2
and prudently."

FIRREA also confirmed the special status of Bank advances in the context of a failed savings institution. As a result of
FIRREA, the FDIC or RTC, as receiver of a failed financial
institution, including a thrift, was expressly given the power to
repudiate burdensome contracts to which the failed institution
was a party before the receivership. 4 3 However, excluded
from the types of contracts subject to such power are those
involving any extension of credit from a Bank or Federal Reserve Bank or any security interest in respect thereof.'4 4 This
provision is consonant with the lien priority given Bank advances by the provisions of the FHLB Act.' 45
I.

Advances to Non-Qualified Thrift Lenders

Although FIRREA amended the FHLB Act to open Bank
membership to those commercial banks and credit unions with
"at least ten percent of its total assets in residential mortgage
loans," 46 it also recognized that providing Bank advances to
institutions which have not made a substantial commitment to
home finance would not further the purposes of the FHLB
Act. Therefore, FIRREA made further amendments to the
FHLB Act to: (1) impose additional stock purchase requirements on borrowing members which do not meet the qualified
thrift lender (QTL) test; 7 (2) permit such non-QTLs access
141.

12 U.S.C. § 1430(a) (1991). For additional information regarding collateral

requirements and the priority of Bank security interests, see Adams & Peck, supra

note 2, at 847-48.
142.

12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1) (1089).

143. Id.
144. /d. § 1821(e)(13).
145. This statutory lien priority section provides that notwithstanding any other
provision of law, any security interest granted to a Federal Home Loan Bank by
any member or any affiliate of any member is entitled to priority over the clails
and rights of any party (including a receiver) other than claims and rights which
would be entitled to priority under otherwise applicable law and which are held
by actual bona ide purchasers for value or by actual secured parties that are secured by actual perfected security interests. Id. § 1430(0.

146. Id. § 1424(a)(2).
147.

Id. §1430(e). Under FIRREA, "any savings association shall have the status
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to advances only "for the purpose of obtaining funds for hous'
ing finance;" 148
(3) require the FHFB to establish a regulato49
ry priority for Bank advances to members that are QTLs;
and (4) require each Bank to limit the aggregate amount of its
to not more than thirty percent of its
advances to non-QTLs
50
total advances.
J.

Role of the Banks in Supporting Troubled Institutions

Although the Banks were never required by statute to act
as a lender of last resort to member institutions, the FHLBB
often attempted to cast the Banks in that role with respect to
troubled thrift institutions. 5 ' FIRREA addressed the Banks'
liquidity role with respect to troubled thrift institutions by
amending the FHLB Act to permit the Banks to provide, upon
the request of the Director of the OTS, short-term "liquidity
advances" to troubled, but solvent, savings associations which
demonstrate reasonable prospects of returning to a satisfactory
financial condition.' Any Bank advance made pursuant to
this provision must comply with all applicable collateral requirements of the FHLB Act, must comply with the Bank's
credit program and must bear an interest rate no less favorable than the rate applicable to short-term liquidity advances

of qualified thrift lender if (A) the qualified thrift investments of such savings
associations exceeds 60 percent of the total tangible assets of such association; and
(B) the qualified thrift investments of such savings association continue to equal
or exceed 60 percent of the total tangible assets of such association on an average
basis in 3 out of every 4 quarters and 2 out of every 3 years." Id. § 1467a(m)(1).
The director of the OTS may grant temporary or limited exceptions from the
minimum actual thrift investment percentage requirement under certain circumstances. Id. § 1467a(m)(2). The term "qualified thrift investments" is defined to
mean loans made to purchase, refinance, construct, improve or repair domestic
residential housing or manufactured housing, home equity loans, securities backed
by or representing interests in mortgages on domestic residential housing or
manufactured housing, and certain obligations of the FDIC or the FSLIC and the
FSLIC Resolution Fund and the RTC. Id. §1467a(m)(4)(B). In addition, certain
other housing-related assets may be included in the definition of qualified thrift
investments subject to certain percentage limitations. See id. § 1467a(m)(5).
148. Id. § 1430(a)(1).
149. Id. § 1430(a)(2).
150. Id.
151. See Adams & Peck, supra note 2, at 849.
152. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1430(h)(1) (1991).
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made available by the Bank to savings associations that do not
53
present a supervisory concern.
These statutory provisions appear to be superfluous since
the Banks are permitted to grant only those advances which
can be made safely and reasonably 54 and which are fully secured. 5 5 Such provisions apparently remain from an earlier
proposed version of FIRREA in which the liquidity advances
provision had been mandatory, rather than permissive in nature. Recognizing that FIRREA would remove its regulatory
control over the Banks, the FHLBB lobbied unsuccessfully for
a provision in FIRREA to require the Banks to make such loans
when requested to do so by the Director of OTS. 56 Such a
provision would have been anomalous in light of congressional
intent to restructure the Bank System to ensure its safe and
sound operation and specifically to prevent the savings institution regulator from interfering' with the Banks and their lending function.
Another aspect of the Banks' role in supporting troubled
institutions is whether the Banks should lend to the agency
which insures the accounts of their member institutions. Prior
to the enactment of FIRREA, the Banks were authorized to
make loans to the FSLIC.' 57 FIRREA amended the FHLB Act
to permit, but not to require, the Banks to make loans to the
FDIC for the use of FSLIC's successor, the SAIF. 158 FIRREA
further provides that any such loan is a direct liability of the
SAIF.' 5 In order to protect the safety and soundness of the
Banks, the interest rate on any such loan must be no less than
the Bank's current marginal cost of funds, and must be "adequately secured." 60

153.

ld. § 1430(h)(2).

154. Id. § 1427(6).
155. Id. § 1430(a).
156. This proposal was reflected in § 717(c) of FIRREA as reported by the
House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs. See H.R. REP. No. 54,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 383 (1989).
157. Former 12 C.F.R. § 531.2(a) (1987).
158. 12 U.S.C. § 1431(k)(1), 1437(a) (1991).
159. Id. § 1431(k)(2).
160. Id. § 1431(k)(3). The Conference Report, in discussing this section of the
legislation, states: "As is the case with all advances by the Banks, loans to the
FDIC for the SAIF must be adequately secured." The Conference Report language
would appear to support the argument that in this context the words "adequately
secured" have the same meaning as the words "fully secured" in 12 U.S.C. §
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These statutory changes strongly suggest that Congress
intended that the Banks should not function as lenders of last
resort to troubled thrift institutions. Indeed, by diverting all of
the Banks' retained earnings to REFCO (which retained earnings had been available as a capital cushion against Bank credit
losses) and by imposing stringent new collateral requirements
upon advances made by the Banks, Congress appears instead
to have intended that the Banks should focus upon their role
in supporting economical home finance through the making of
secure loans to strong insured insured depository institutions. 6'
K. Interest Rate Swaps and Letters of Credit
In addition to making advances, Banks are permitted to
enter into interest rate swaps, caps, collars, floors and other
hedging transactions with their members,' 62 and to issue irrevocable standby letters of credit for their members' accounts. 63 These sophisticated financial devices are merely
additional tools to be used in safely and soundly making loans
to fund members' home mortgages. Except with respect to the
collateral requirements discussed above, FIRREA did not affect
the authority of the Banks to engage in these transactions.'64
L.

Community Lending Programs

FIRREA expanded upon the Banks' traditional role of
providing funds for housing finance by establishing two new
lending programs: a Community Investment Program and an
Affordable Housing Program.'6 5 Although the Banks had
participated in various forms of community investment fund

1430(a). H.R. CONF. REI'P.No. 222, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 426 (1989). As of this
writing, no loans to the FDIC for the use of the SAIF have been niade by any of

the Banks.
161.

Cf H.R. REP. No. 54,

101st Cong.,

Ist Sess. 454 (1989)

("the principal

function of the Federal Home Loan Banks is to promote economical housing
finance by serving as lending facilities for their iember institutions").
162. FHLBB, FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANKS INTEREST RATE SWAP, CAP, COLLAR,
AND FLOOR POLICY GUIDELINES (Aug. 28, 1987).
163. FHLBB, OFFICE or DISTRICT BANKS, POLICY GUIDELINES FOR ISSUANCE OF
FHLB LETrERS OF CREDIT (Nov. 21, 1985).
164. For additional information regarding Bank swaps and letters of credit, see
Adams & Peck, supra note 2, at 850-51.
165. 12 U.S.C. § 1430(i), (j) (West Stipp. 1991).
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programs prior to FIRREA,"'6 no mandatory program had
existed since the expiration in 1983 of the five-year "Community Investment Fund" program established by the former
FHLBB. 6 7
FIRREA amended the FHLB Act to require that each
Bank establish a program to provide funds for members' use
in undertaking community-oriented mortgage lending.'
Such lending would finance (1) home purchases by families
with income at or below 115% of the area median income, or
the purchase or rehabilitation of housing for occupancy by
such families; or (2) commercial and economic development
activities that benefit low and moderate income families or
neighborhoods.' 6 9 Advances under this program are to be
priced at the cost of consolidated Bank obligations of comparable maturities, plus reasonable administrative costs.

70

While the Community Investment program requires the
Banks to make advances at no profit, another FIRREA addition, the Affordable Housing Program, requires that the Banks
provide subsidized advances (or direct subsidies) to members
engaged in lending for long-term, low and moderate income,
owner-occupied and affordable rental housing.' 7 ' The Banks
are required to provide subsidies equal to five percent of earnings, or $50 million, whichever is greater, for each year from
1990 through 1993; six percent of earnings or $75 million in
1994; and ten percent of earnings or $100 million in each year
thereafter. 17 The Banks' contribution to the Affordable
Housing Program during 1990 was $78.8 million; their alloca173
tion in 1991 is $59.5 million.
166. See, e.g.,

1989 FHLB ANN. REP. 5-6. See also TREASURY DEPARTMENT

STUDY, supra note 3, at XV-9.
167. TREASURY DEPARTMENT STUDY, supra note 3, at XV-9.
168. 12 U.S.C. § 1430(i) (West Supp. 1991). The Conference Report expressed
Congressional dissatisfaction with the Banks' past performance in this area, stating:
"The conferees are mindfil of the uneven use of similar special advance programs
maintained by the Federal Home Loan Banks in the past and the reluctance of

some of the Banks to actively encourage their member institutions to address critical community investment and affordable housing needs."

H.R. CONF. REP. No.

222, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 429 (1989).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. 12 U.S.C. § 1430(j) (West Supp. 1991). See also TREASURY DEPARTMENT
STUDY, supin note 3, at XV-9.

172. Id. § 1430(j)(5) (West Stipp. 1991).
173.

Thus, tihe first year of the Affordable Housing program created affordable
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Funds advanced under the Affordable Housing Program
generally may be used by members to finance (1) home ownership for families with income at orbelow.eighty percent of the
area median income; or (2) the purchase, construction or rehabilitation of rental housing in which at least twenty percent of
the units will be occupied by very low-income households (at
or below fifty percent of the area median income) for the remaining useful life of such housing or the mortgage term.'74
If a Bank fails to fund or commit all of its required subsidy in any year, ninety percent of the unused amount must be
deposited by the Bank in an Affordable Housing Reserve Fund
administered by the FHFB. 175 The remaining ten percent of
the unused amount must then be utilized by the Bank during
the following year, with any remaining portion to be deposited
in the Reserve Fund.'76 Moneys from the Reserve Fund may
be made available to any Bank to meet additional affordable
177
housing needs.

The statute provides that the FHFB may approve a temporary suspension of contributions under the program if it finds
that the payments are contributing to a Bank's financial instability. 17 In determining the financial instability of a Bank,
the FHFB must consider such factors as whether the Bank's
earnings are severely depressed, whether there has been a substantial decline in member capital, and whether there has been
a substantial reduction in advances outstanding. 179 The
FHFB may not approve a suspension of payments if the reduction in earnings is a result of changes in terms of advances
which are not justified by market conditions, inordinate operating and administrative expenses, or mismanagement.'
FIRREA requires that the FHFB notify the House and Senate
Banking Committees at least sixty days prior to the effective

housing valued at $1.2 billion, leveraged by the $78.8 million from tile Banks. See
TREASURY DEPARTMENT STUDY, supra note 3, at XV-10.

174.

12 U.S.C. § 14300)(2) (West Supp. 1991).

175.

Id. § 1430(0)(7).

176. id.
177. Id.
178. Id. § 1430(0)(6).
179. Id.
180.

Id.
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date of any approved suspension.181 By joint resolution, Con82
gress may disallow any such suspension.
In order to assist the Banks in meeting the affordable
housing needs of their districts, FIRREA requires that each
18
Bank appoint an Affordable Housing Advisory Council. 1
Each Advisory Council consists of seven to fifteen persons
drawn from community and nonprofit organizations which
provide or promote low and moderate income housing in the
relevant Bank's district.'84 The Advisory Council is required
to meet quarterly with representatives of the Bank's board of
directors to provide advice on stimulating affordable housing
programs, and is responsible for submitting to the FHFB an
annual report analyzing the low- income housing activity of its
8 5 The FHFB, in turn,
Bank."
must report annually to Congress and to each Advisory Council with respect to the Banks'
performance under the Affordable Housing Program.'8 6 After the program has been operational for two years, the Comptroller General will audit, evaluate, and recommend to Congress any improvements or modifications to the program."7
Contrary to the "open window" approach followed by
most Banks with respect to their Community Investment Program lending (as well as lending under regular advances programs), the Affordable Housing Program regulations promulgated by the FHFB require that each Bank conduct
district-wide competitions for program funds during two of
four quarterly application periods each year.' The regulations specify a thirty-day review period by the relevant Bank,
with final funding decisions to be announced by the FHFB
within thirty days following the Bank's review period.' The
regulations establish uniform priorities for project funding,
and they specify the relative weights to be accorded each pri19
ority. 0

181.
182.

I.
Id.

183.
184.
185.

Id. § 1430(j)(II).
Id.
Id.

186. Id. § 1430(j)(12).
187. Id.
188. 12 C.F.R. § 960.1 (1990).
189. Id. § 960.5.
190. 12 C.F.R. § 960.5 (1991); 12 U.S.C. § 1422(a)(3) (1991).
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In operation, the Affordable Housing Program subsidizes
projects proposed to the Banks by their members. The first
year of the Program awarded funds to create affordable housing valued at $1.2 billion, leveraged by the $78.8 million from
the Banks. These funds will be used to generate approximately
24,000 single and multi-family units in some 382 projects. Similarly, in the first round of competition in 1991, the Banks
awarded $33.2 million which will leverage $430 million in
housing construction, rehabilitation and mortgage financ19 1
ing.

M.

Other Bank Services and Powers After FIRREA

The FHLB Act, both before and after FIRREA, has provided that the Banks may "do all things necessary for carrying out
the provisions of the [FHLB Act] and all things incident thereto.'1

2

However, before FIRREA, the FHLB Act provided

that no Bank may transact any banking or other business not
authorized by the FHLB Act.' 9 3 In 1977, a federal district
court held that the Banks may not issue money orders' 94 and
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations (ADAPSO) v. Federal Home Loan
Bank Board,'9 5 held that five Banks may not sell on-line data
processing services to members. Thus, under prior law, the
Banks' authority to engage in correspondent services was significantly constrained.
FIRREA made a significant, though little discussed, change
in the scope of the authorized correspondent service activities
of the Banks. As amended, the FHLB Act now provides: "No
Federal Home Loan Bank shall transact any banking or other
business not incidental to activities authorized by [the FHLB
Act]."' 96 The phrase "incidental to activities" was inserted by
FIRREA and appears to be intended to give the Banks broader
191. See supra note 171; see aLso FHFB,
NOUNCES

FIRST ROUND AFFORDABLE

FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE BOARD ANHOUSING AWARDS (Press Release No. 91-21;

June 18, 1991).
192. 12 U.S.C. 1431(a) (1990).

193. Id. § 143 1(e)(1).

194. Central Bank v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 430 F. Supp. 1080 (N.D. Cal.
1977).
195. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. (ADAPSO) v. Federal Home
Loan Bank Bd., 568 F.2d 478 (6th Cir. 1977).
196. 12 U.S.C. § 1431(e)(1) (1991) (emphasis added).
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authority to engage in activities incidental to their express
powers. The language would also appear to overrule the
ADAPSO case. Indeed, the legislative history of FIRREA suggests that the drafters specifically intended to overrule the
ADAPSO case. The Conference Committee's explanation of the
amendment provides that incidental activities include:
[T]he collection and settlement of checks and related services that the banks can provide to or for members. The
banks call also provide courier and custody services for,
and can process and transmit information related to, these
services. The banks are also able to provide other correspondent banking services for members. This includes the
reconciliation of customer accounts and servicing payrolls,
as well as tile analysis and transmission of such information. 1
The services referred to in the Conference Committee
report, i.e., the reconciliation of customer accounts, servicing
payrolls and analysis and transmission of information, are essentially the same as those on-line data processing services at
issue in ADAPSO"' 8
The House Report also states:
The Federal -omeI Loan Banks may engage in all activities
authorized under the Federal Home Loan Bank Act. Notwithstanding the authority to engage in corresponding
[sic] banking activities, the principal function of the Federal Home Loan Banks is to promote economical housing
finance by serving as lending facilities for their member
institutions.'W
The amendment's sponsor also emphasized that it broadened the scope of incidental activities permissible under the
FHLB Act:
['T]he amendment is intended to permit the Federal Home
Loan Banks to engage in activities incidental to their express statu tory powers, and that Congress contemplated
this incidental power to be broadly read.

197. Joint Explatiatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, 135 CONG.
REC. 15288 (daily cd. Aug. 4, 1989).
198. See ADAP50, 568 F.2d at 481-82.
199. IR. REt'. No. 54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 454 (1989).
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Congress intended the amendment to allow a wide
variety of incidental activities, these would include, for
example, the collection and settlement of'checks and related services, courier and custody services. The Federal
Home Loan Banks can also provide services like the reconciliation of customer accounts, servicing of payrolls and
other corresponding banking services. Incidental services
would extend to the analysis and data processing and
transmission of information related to all of these services.
Incidental activities do not need to be strictly necessary to the home loan banks' exercise of their express
powers. Neither are they limited to activities that only the
banks can engage in, or services only they can perform.
The amendment is intended to ensure that the banks may
provide a variety of products and services. This variety
makes membership in the banks appealing to eligible institutions. By sustaining membership, the banks are better
.able to meet the financial obligations that the act imposes
2
on them. 00
To date, most of the Banks have not attempted to expand
their incidental activities as authorized by FIRREA. As before
FIRREA, they continue to offer a variety of deposit products,
to act as trustee of trusts affecting their members' business, to
hold mortgage loans and securities in safekeeping for their
members, and to provide limited correspondent services (as
previously authorized by the FHLB Act) for both member
institutions and those institutions "eligible to make application
20 1
to become members."

N. Future Challenges to the Home Loan Bank System: The Banks'
Challenges Now Differ From Those of the Past
Perspective on the formidable challenges confronting the
Banks can be gained by considering the Banks' historical role.
During the Great Depression, mortgage loan defaults, declines
in the value of collateral, and heavy savings account withdrawals resulted in the failure of 1,700 savings institutions. 2 In

200. 135 CONG. REC. H4994 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989) (remarks of Congressman
Garcia).
201. For additional information regarding other Bank services to member
thrifts, see Adams & Peck, supra note 2, at 852-53.
202. See PAUl. H. LOCKWOOD, FHILBB, A GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN
BANK SYSTEM 8 (5th ed. 1987).
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response to this liquidity crisis, Congress created the Federal
Home Loan Bank System in 1932.03 Initially capitalized by
the federal government, the Banks' members eventually capitalized the Banks and repaid the government's capital. 4 The
Banks were to advance funds to their members on the security
of home mortgage loans, thereby liquifying these institutions'
portfolios and enabling them to meet savings withdrawals.
By 1933, forty percent of the nation's $20 billion of home
mortgages were in default.20 5 Although the Banks could meet
the liquidity needs of solvent members with adequate collateral, the Banks were neither capitalized for, nor competent to
fund the liquidity needs of, thrifts with few or no performing
home mortgages. Thus, Congress created the Home Owners'
Loan Corporation (HOLC) to purchase defaulted mortgages
from thrifts. 2 6 The combination of loans from the Banks
and purchases of defaulted mortgages by the HOLC was a major factor in permitting savings institutions to meet the liquidity crisis of the Great Depression. °7 With the creation of the
FSLIC in 1934,08 customer anxiety about the safety of their
deposits was reduced, thereby slowing the heavy deposit withdrawals and the concomitant need for liquidity.
HOLC and the FSLIC enabled the Banks to concentrate
on their role of making loans to solvent members for the purpose of furthering economical housing finance. The Banks
successfully fulfilled their role as the central bank for housing
finance in America until the emergence of the second national
thrift crisis in the late 1980s. When it became apparent that
the FSLIC had insufficient resources to resolve the myriad
a
problems of the savings and loan industry, the Banks 20became
9
challenge.
this
with
deal
to
funds
of
source
tempting
Initially, efforts to tap Bank resources were modest. As the
FHLBB became increasingly aware of the degree to which
failed institutions depended on brokered deposits in the

203.

See generally id.

204.

Id. at 9.

205. Id.
206. 12 U.S.C. § 1463 (1947).
207.
208.

See LocKWOOD, suna note 202, at 9-12.
Pursuant to Title IV of the National Housing Act ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246

(1934).
209.

Telephone Interview with Gary

L. Curly, Senior Vice President, Federal

Hone Loan of Bank of' San Francisco (Aug. I, 1991).
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mid-1980s, the FHLBB looked to the Banks as a liquidity
source to replace such deposits at failed or failing institutions.2 1 Since the failure of an institution due to illiquidity is
the principal risk that deposit insurance is designed to address, 2 11 the FSLIC was understandably reluctant to seize
such institutions, fearing that a series of seizures could cause
systemic shocks to the industry which would shatter depositor
confidence. Although from time to time, the FSLIC did close
institutions as a result of an inability to honor savings
withdrawals (including the notorious example in the early
1980s of Fidelity Savings and Loan Association of Oakland,
California), in most cases the FHLBB preferred to have the
Banks extend credit to these institutions to the maximum extent possible.
Typically, as an institution began to fail and money started
to flow from the institution, those funds were replaced by
borrowings from the appropriate Bank.2 12 As collateral for
such borrowings, the Bank would first take a security interest
in the institution's eligible collateral, including one-to-four
family home mortgages and mortgage- backed securities. However, as the institution's liquidity needs continued and its eligible collateral was exhausted, the Bank would take a security
interest in "ineligible" collateral, such as commercial real estate
loans, land loans, acquisition, development and construction
loans, consumer loans and ultimately even real estate and furniture and fixtures.
When a failing institution totally exhausted its supply of
both eligible and ineligible collateral, the FSLIC sought to have
the Bank extend credit based upon the creditworthiness of the
FSLIC. Thus, the FSLIC would "guarantee" the repayment of

210. An early and characteristic example was provided by American Savings
and Loan of California (American), at the time the largest savings and loan association in tie United States. In Augnst 1984, American's parent was required to
reduce its reported profitability by the SEC. Approximately 70% of American's
deposits were brokered deposits which began to be withdrawn. The withdrawal
amounted to hundreds of millions of dollars per (lay. Advances by the Federal
Home Loan Bank of San Francisco were used to meet this extraordinary withdrawal demand. See R. D.A\NBRUMB, AUGH, JR., THRIFTS UNDER SIEGE, RESTORING
ORDER TO AMERICAN BANKING 129-30 (1988).
211. TREASURY DEPARTMENT STUDY, supra note 3, Discussion Chapter I, at 1-4
to 1-5.

212. See A1CP Program Doomed if FSLIC Recap Plan Is Scuttled, THE BANK
BOARD WATCH, jan. 30, 1987, at 1-1-4.
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Bank advances that were not adequately secured by appropriate collateral. ' Initially, the FSLIC was prepared to extend
guarantees to the Bank without seizing the failed institution.2 4 The practice soon ceased because the FSLIC decided
that such guarantees constituted a form of "open bank assistance" which was not appropriate public policy. 215 As a result, the government began to take control of these failed institutions, and then to guarantee repayment of Bank advances in
order to ensure a continuing source of liquidity for the FSLIC,
as receiver or conservator for the failed institution, to meet the.
continuing withdrawal demands of its depositors.
When the FSLIC recognized that it did not have sufficient
funds to resolve all such failed institutions in this manner and
that the large number of insolvent thrifts would bankrupt the
FSLIC before it could sell the deposits of such institutions, the
FSLIC began to utilize the device of the so-called
"pass-through" receivership to allow failed institutions to continue in operation, but under stringent government limitations. In a pass-through receivership, the FSLIC would organize a new federal mutual savings association to which it would
transfer certain of the assets and liabilities of the failed thrift.
Although essentially a holding action until time and resources
could be found to sell or liquidate the deposits of the failed
institution, the FSLIC apparently had hoped that the mutual
form of organization, combined with close government super-

vision, would restore depositor confidence until the thrift
could be sold. However, since these institutions typically were
required to pay higher interest rates than solvent thrifts in
order to attract deposits, they continued to incur substantial
losses. The financial condition of the failed thrifts worsened, as
did that of the FSLIC since its deposit insurance responsibilities increased with the growing operating and asset losses of
the failed thrifts. Accordingly, the Banks became increasingly

213. Telephone Interview with Gary 1. Curly, Senior Vice President, Federal
Home Loan Bank of San Franciso (Aug. I, 1991).

214.

Id.

215. The FDIC was authorized by the Garn St. Germain )epository Institutions
Act to make loans to, make deposits, purchase the assets or securities of, or make
contributions to an insured bank in order to prevelit the baiik fromi closiig or
reopen a closed hank. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(1). nese various forms of activity
are often referred to as "open bamik assistance."
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reluctant to accept FSLIC guarantees alone as eligible collateral
for advances.
At the same time that the FSLIC was seeking substantial
liquidity support fiom the Banks, the FSLIC staff proposed
new conservatorship and receivership regulations 21 which
attempted to give the FSLIC broad powers to avoid or set
aside security interests in the assets of failed thrifts, including_
Bank security interests protecting Bank advances. The FSLIC
staff also threatened to use federal common law lien avoidance
theories, such as are available under the federal bankruptcy
law, to set aside the interests of the. Bank in collateral pledged
2 17
to secure Bank advances.

This juxtaposition of the FSLIC's requests of the Banks for
assistance in dealing with the thrift crisis coupled with threatened attacks on the Banks' collateral position arose from the
FSLIC's understandable temptation to tap the Bank's resources
for the FSLIC's own purposes, while at the same time attempting to treat the Banks as any other creditor. Not unexpectedly,
as the FSLIC's financial condition deteriorated, the Banks grew
increasingly skeptical that the FHLBB would protect them
from the FSLIC's ever-expanding need for cash. Consequently,
by year-end 1988, many of the Banks sought additional assurances from the FHLBB about the future of the FSLIC and
their rights in the collateral securing their advances."'
Early in 1989, this temptation to use the Banks to solve
the FSLIC's problems also apparently led the Treasury Department to direct the FHLBB to institute an "interim lending
program."2 19 Prior to the enactment of FIRREA, but as part
of its effort to resolve the thrift crisis, the Bush Administration
devised a plan to step up the pace of conservatorship and receiverships for insolvent savings and loan associations. Anticipating that such action would precipitate savings outflows at
these institutions and that the increased volume of liquidating
receiverships would increase the cash needs of government receivers, the Administration's plan contemplated that the Banks
would provide liquidity for these institutions.2 Pursuant to
216.* See 50 Fed. Reg. 48,970, 48,976, 48,990 (Nov. 27, 1985).
217. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547-548 (1991).
218. Telephone Interview with Gary L. Curly, Senior Vice President, Federal
Home Loan Bank of San Francisco (Aug. I, 1991).
219.

See supra text accomnpanyilg noles 135-38.

220. See FI.L.,B Res. 89-323NP (Feb. 21, 1989) and letter of Feb. 21, 1989,
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the plan, the Banks were asked to: (1) increase the borrowing
capacity attributable to collateral currently considered "eligible" under their credit programs; 2 1 (2) expand the definition
of "eligible collateral" under their credit programs; 222 (3) accept "ineligible collateral" as security for borrowings when an
insolvent member had no "eligible collateral;" 223 and (4) limit
lending to healthy members to ensure availability of funds for
lending to insolvent thrifts. 2 4 The plan further contemplated
that when an insolvent thrift had exhausted all of its collateral
security (both eligible and ineligible), subsequent loans to the
institution would be made pursuant to a shared lending arrangement involving the Bank, the local Federal Reserve Bank
and the FSLIC. 25 Under this "interim lending program," the
Bank and the Federal Reserve Bank would each provide
forty-five percent of the funds to the institution, 2 6 with the
FSLIC providing the remaining ten percent. 27 The FSLIC
would obtain its funds by accessing its $750 million line of
credit at the Treasury (up to a maximum of $700 million).22 8
Once the FSLIC had exhausted the entire $700 million, the
Bank and the Federal Reserve Bank would increase their funding shares to fifty percent each.2 9 Collateral for advances
funded under the shared lending program would be whatever
the FSLIC could provide, such as FSLIC notes and subrogated
interests in FSLIC receivership assets. In addition, the insol-

fi'om Alan Greenspan, Clairman of the Federal Reserve Board, and M. Danny
Wall, Chairman of Fl II.,LB, to Nicholas F. Brady, Secretary of the Treasury. See
also Michael A. Robinson, S & L Regulato)s for West Coast Head to Capital, AM.
BANKER, Mar'. 3, 1989, at I; Alan Murray & G. Christian Hill, California Home
Loan Bank Rejects Role in Bush's Back-up Funding Plan for S & L s, WALL. ST. J.,

Feb. 24, 1989, at A-3; Jim McTague & Robert M. Garrson, Fed Will Provide Funds
to Thrifts Facing Deposit Runs, AM. BANKER, Feb. 23, 1989, at 3.
221. FI-ILBB Res. 89-323NP (Feb. 21, 1989), and Greenspan and Wall letter,
supra note 220.

222. FHLBB
supra note 220.
223. FHLBB
supra note 220.
224. FHIBB
supra note 220.
225. FHILBB

Res. 89-323Nl' (Feb. 21,

1989), and Greenspan and Wall letter,

Res. 89-323NP (Feb. 21,

1989), and Greenspan and Wall letter,

Res. 89-323N1' (Feb. 21,

1989), and Greenspan and Wall letter,

(Feb. 21,

1989), and Greenspani and Wall letter,

Res. 89-323N'

supra note 220.
226. Murray & Hill, supra note 220.

227. 1988 FILB ANN. REP. 52 (1989).
228. FHLBB Res. 89-323N' (Feb. 21, 1989), supra note 220.
229. FHLBB Res. 89-323N1' (Feb. 21, 1989), supra note 220.
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vent FSLIC would guarantee repayment of loans made under
the interim lending program.23 °
Upon introduction of the plan, eleven of the twelve Banks,
and all twelve of the Federal Reserve Banks, agreed to participate in the program.2 ' The San Francisco Bank, however,
initially would not agree to participate in the program as it was
proposed. 2 Concerns were expressed that making such
loans would expose the Bank to substantial losses, in contravention of its statutory mandate to make only such loans as
can be made "safely and reasonably., 2 - In addition, it was
recognized that any losses suffered, by the Bank pursuant to
the program would directly injure the Bank's members because
such losses would be charged against the members' paid-in
capital. Finally, there was concern that participation in the program could prevent the Bank from fulfilling its statutory mission to provide funds for housing finance by diverting substantial liquidity to insolvent thrifts which had largely abandoned
234
making home loans.

After extensive discussions with the FHLBB and Bush
Administration officials, and after receiving assurances that the
Bank could maintain its existing collateral requirements, the
directors of the San Francisco Bank determined that, consistent with their statutory and fiduciary duties, they could authorize the Bank's participation in the program up to an aggregate amount of $100 million. The San Francisco Bank funded
advances to one institution to the limit imposed by its directors. The Dallas Bank also funded a small amount of advances
under the program. Advances which remained outstanding
following enactment of FIRREA were subsequently repaid by
the RTC pursuant to FIRREA. 3 5

230. Murray & Hill, supra note 220; Greenspan and Wall letter, supra note
220; Robinson, supra note 220.
231. Murray & Hill, supra note 220; Robinson, supra note 220; McTague &

Garrson, supra note 220.
232. Murray & Hill, supra note 220; Robinson, supra note 220; McTague &
Garrson, supra note 220.
233. See supra note 220.
234. See supra note 220.
.235. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(h) (West Supp. 1991).
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THE BANKS' NEW CHALLENGES

Now that the deposit insurer for the thrift industry has no
supervisory relationship with the Banks, nor any legal ability to
compel liquidity lending that will endanger the financial position of the Banks, the Banks' primary focus will be that of a
financial intermediary for housing finance lenders. The substantial FIRREA-created burdens facing the Banks, in addition
to other of the FIRREA requirements adversely impacting the
thrift industry, will challenge the Banks in fulfilling this housing finance mission.
First, FIRREA confiscated the entire retained earnings of
the Banks (as of December 31, 1988, $2.1 billion), by requiring
that these earnings, in addition to $300 million per annum
thereafter, be contributed to REFCO.2 36 This obligation,
which will span a period of at least forty years, is in addition to
the Banks' obligations under CEBA to capitalize FICO (which
obligations have thus far totaled approximately $680 million).
Second, Congress decided to require the Banks to fund new
237 The
low income housing programs at subsidized rates.
amount of annual Bank contributions to these programs will
increase over time from an aggregate five percent of earnings
(approximately $78.8 million in 1990 and $59.5 million in
1991), to ten percent of earnings (or a minimum aggregate of
2 38
These
$100 million) in 1995 and thereafter.
FIRREA-imposed burdens of approximately $400 million annually are, in effect, a tax which will result in a direct loss of
capital and reduced earnings for the Banks.
In the recent past, the earnings of most Banks enabled
them to pay dividends in the range of approximately ten to
twelve percent per annum.239 These dividend rates made
Bank stock an attractive investment, and generated additional,
"voluntary" stock put'chases. After FIRREA, the dividend rate
will most likely approximate the six-month Treasury bill rate

236. Id. § 14411b(c)(3), (O(2)(C).
237. Id. § 1430().
238. "['RLASURY DIEI'IAR'IINT STUDY, supra note 3, at XV-10.
239. Oversight Hearing to Examine the Impact of FIBREA on the Federal Home
Loan Bank System: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on General Oveinight and Investigations, House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., Ist Sess.
84 (1989) (statenti of 'hl'hirI an Coi cl).
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which, although still an attractive rate (especially given that
taxes on dividends paid in stock, as has been the Banks'
long-standing practice, are deferred until redemption of such
stock) is likely to attract fewer voluntary stock purchases, and
thus, less additional capital for the Banks. Moreover, many
members have withdrawn their voluntary stock holdings following the enactment of FIRREA. Historically, roughly ten to
twenty percent of the stock of the Banks has been held by
members in excess of statutory requirements, given the attractiveness of such stock as an investment.24 ° Since August
1989, the great majority of that excess stock has been redeemed, with system-wide redemptions of over $2 billion
1
through early April 1990.2 1
In addition, if certain state-chartered thrifts are not required to maintain Bank membership (and, therefore, their
investment in Bank stock), further deterioration in the capital
positions of the Banks may occur. Although all federally chartered savings institutions are required by statute to be members of a Bank, state-chartered savings institutions have no
statutory membership requirement.2412 Historically, many
state-chartered savings institutions which were formerly insured
by the FSLIC were required, as a condition for insurance of
accounts, to become members of a Bank.243 However, certain
savings institutions, many of whom were already Bank members upon obtaining FSLIC insurance, were not explicitly required by the FSLIC to maintain Bank membership as a condition of insurance of accounts. Several such institutions in various Bank districts requested that the FDIC confirm that their
deposit insurance is not conditioned upon Bank membership.
On August 28, 1990, the FDIC responded to one such request
by advising that it could not assure that federal deposit insurance would be available to a thrift withdrawing from membership in a Federal Home Loan Bank.2 44

240. Id. at 33 (testillolly of' Barney Becksma).
241. Gordon Matthews, Banks' Shares Resist Market fiend4 But Analysts Opinion
Hurls, AM. BANKER, Apr. 25, 1990, at 24.

242. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(0; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1424(c) (1989).
243. LocKwooD, supra note 202, at 64.
244. See FDIC Offers No Guarantee of Deposit Insurance for S&Ls Leaving the
FHLIs, 55 BNA BANKI.c; REi,. 379 (Sept. 10, 1990).
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A reduction in the number of thrift institutions due to
failure, merger and, particularly, acquisition by nonthrift
acquirors also has the potential to adversely affect the Banks.
The resolution of the thrift crisis could well result in a reduction in the number of thrift institutions from over 3,000 to
approximately 800 to 1,200. Moreover, the assets of many
failed thrifts have been purchased by commercial banks which,
to date, have generally not indicated an interest in Bank membership. This has resulted in additional stock redemptions.24 5
Decreased demand for advances will also adversely affect
Bank earnings. At year-end 1990, aggregate advances totaled
$117.1 billion, down from $141.8 billion at year-end 1989.246
Advance levels are likely to drop even further as regulators
seize more thrifts." 7 In addition, the more stringent capital
provisions of FIRREA have required many thrifts to shrink in
size. By reducing Bank advances, such an institution often can
effect shrinkage without damage to its core deposit base. This
downward trend in advance demand is, therefore, likely to
continue until (1) the industry meets its capital standards so
that it can support additional growth; (2) other well-capitalized
financial institutions join the Bank System; or (3) the government once again turns to the Banks as a liquidity lender to the
thrift industry.
New regulatory relationships also affect the post-FIRREA
environment facing the Banks. The regulatory bodies now entrusted with receivership authority (and, therefore, lien avoidance authority) have no previous relationship with the Banks.

245. For example, as of" December 31, 1988, total Bank capital was $15.5 billion, while as of Septemnbe:r 30, 1990, totalcapital was $11.8 billion, a reduction
of over 20%. 1988 FlIHLII ANN. REI'. 69; TREASURY DEPARTMENT STUDY, supra note
3, at XV-2. Hlowever, approximately $1 billion of tie capital reduction represents
sums contributed to REFCO, rather than capital stock redemptions. Interview with

Jerry Hartzog, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, Federal HoIme
Loan Bank in San Francisco, CA (Augulst 2, 1991). During 1990, 362 thrifts (11%
of memberships as oF.January I, 1990) left te Home Loan Bank System due to
governmenlt assisted resolutions or other acquisitions. WORLD SAVINGS AND LOAN,
CAN "I-1i"FEDER.

HOME LOAN

BANKS

REMAIN

VIABLE
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une 17, 1991) (1tipublished mamnscript).
246. SECRETARY 01 TIlE:TREASURY, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON COVERNMENT SPONSORED ENrERI'RISES, at A-22 (Apr. 1991).
247. In July of 1991, the Chairman of the FHFB predicted that 1991 advance
levels will dro) to 50% of 1990 levels. FIFB Chairman Forecasts 50 Peirent Decline
in FIFB Advances lo Methem, BNA BANKINc; DAILY, July 25, 1991, at I.
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Those agencies, the RTC and the FDIC, are likely to view their
own responsibilities to reduce the cost of the FSLIC bailout
and to preserve the deposit insurance funds as paramount to
the protection of the Banks. The Banks can expect, therefore,
a more unambiguously hostile environment in their dealings
with institutions in conservatorship or receivership. The RTC
and the FDIC will not hesitate to assert their rights as conservator or receiver, even to the detriment of the Banks. This
contrasts with the pre-FIRREA environment, in which the
FSLIC either eventually repaid Bank advances to a failed institution or transferred such advances to another creditworthy
member. As a result of these practices, no Bank has ever been
required to foreclose upon and liquidate the collateral securing
its advances. 2'
Will the admission of commercial banks to the Federal
Home Loan Bank System be sufficient to offset these adverse
factors? Through July of 1991, the Federal Home Loan Banks
had added 250 commercial banks to the System, including
approximately sixteen with $1 billion or more in assets. 24 9
In summary, the Banks' obligations under FIRREA, the
overall decline in advance demand and the redemption of
Bank stock all affect the most critical Bank account-the capital
account. Like any other corporate entity, the Banks cannot
survive without sufficient permanent capital. In spite of these
adversities, the Bank System currently remains well-capitalized
but will need to reposition itself in order to maintain adequate
capital and meet the ongoing demands imposed by FIRREA.
The Banks have several options to enhance capital and
earnings, although the risks, likelihood of success and public
policy issues vary with each option. For example, the Banks
could attempt to reduce operating expenses in order to in-

248. Teleplhone interview with Gary L. Curly, Senior Vice President, Federal
Florae Loan Bank Of San Francisco (Aug. I, 1991).
249. See FI"B Proposes Changes to Director Requirements; 250th Bank Joins System,
BNA BANKING I)AILY, July 24, 1991, at 5. It has been suggested by the chairman
of the Federal Housing Iinance Board ihat n ew applicants could briing the total
commercial baIiks to join ihe sysieiii to apl)roximately 350 by year- end 1991. See
Seven Regionals joit Home Loan Irink System, AM. BANKER, May 20, 1991, at 2.
However, it reinis
to be seei whethecr horrowings froi inew comnercial baink

members will be sufficient to offset siilsiantial declines ini advance levels due to
the contraction of the thrift iiidtisiry. Id. Through May 1991, new commercial
bank members had borrowed aproximately $1 billion frint the System. Id.
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crease the profit made on advances. One of several ways to
reduce such expenses which has been discussed in the press is
to reduce the number of Banks by consolidation. 5 °
Some Banks believe that expanding the list of entities
eligible to become members and borrow from the Banks could
help offset the problem of reduced earnings. 251' This proposal has not been endorsed by all of the Banks.
Another proposal to increase capital adequacy is to afford
the Banks the opportunity to leverage further their capital
through the increased issuance of debt. 25 2 The Banks believe

that by increasing leverage, the Banks will be able to reduce
the rate of interest they must charge on advances. Such a reduction in advance rates would make the Banks a more competitive source of funds for those commercial banks and credit
unions able to become Bank members, and would also make
the Banks a more attractive source of funds for healthy thrift
institutions which presently only fund approximately ten percent of their assets with Bank advances.
In July of 1991, the Chairman of the Housing Finance
Board suggested that the Banks are in fact over-capitalized at a
total of $11.2 billion (7.7% of total assets) and said that the
present capital requirements limit the ability of the Banks to
offer housing finance to their support of members.25 3 The
Chairman also suggested that lower mortgage rates from system members could be achieved if the capital requirements for
the Federal Home Loan Bank System are lowered. 25 At
about the same time, an industry trade group issued a warning
that the balance sheet of the Federal Home Loan Bank System
of
at the end of May 1991, had "revealed further weakening" 255
the System which demanded immediate legislative action.

250.

See The Issue of Consolidating the FHL Banks Ttiggeti

Heated Debate in S&L

Industy, THEi TIRIfr REGULArOR, Apr. 27, 1990; Bailout Blues: Home Loan Banks
Can't Turn the Corner, INsTirTUION..\.

INVESTOR, INC., BANK LETI'ER, al

I (Jtne 25,

1990).
251. See Federal Home Lioan Bank System NeeL Change to Attract More Commercial
Banks, BNA BANKINcG Dxii.y, Oct. 12, 100, at 10.
252. Letter [riom "T]huriamm C. CoMI-ll, Chaiinan, Bank Presidents' Caucus, to

Mary K. Bush, Maiaging I)irector of' the Federal
1990).

lousing Finance Board (May I,

253. See Fl-FB Chairman Foreoasts 50 Percent Decline in FHFB Advances to Membets, BNA BANKING IILY, jidy 25, 1991, at I.
254. Id.

255.

Id.
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The trade group urged Congress to drop the $300 million
annual payment from the Federal Home Loan Bank System to
help pay for thrift resolutions and suggested instead a change
to a percentage of earnings of the Banks rather than the fixed
payments.

25 6

The trade group also noted that the stock in

the Federal Home Loan Banks represents about one quarter of
the net worth of the entire U.S. savings and loan industry and
that as Federal Home Loan Bank income falls, so does the
stock dividend on which many thrifts depend for
profitability. "7
Currently, the Banks are subject to certain regulatory restrictions in the issuance of consolidated debt obligations, the
only public debt now issued by the Banks. 258 The regulations
adopted by the FHLBB, in 1946, and carried forward by the
FHFB, establish two specific restrictions on the issuance of
consolidated Bank debt: (1) that the FHFB will not issue consolidated Bank bonds in excess of twelve times the total paid-in
capital stock and reserves of all of the Banks and (2) that the
Banks shall at all times maintain assets of the following types,
free from any lien or pledge, in a total amount at least equal
to the amount of consolidated bonds outstanding-(a) cash; (b)
obligations of or fully guaranteed by the United States; (c)
secured advances; and (d) mortgages as to which one or more
Banks have any guaranty or insurance, or commitment there259
for, by the United States or any agency thereof.
The efficacy of the twelve-to-one leverage ratio has been
the subject of debate, with recent regulatory actions suggesting
that other indicia better reflect capital adequacy. According to
regulations promulgated by the OTS and the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) attention should focus on
the relation of capital to asset utilization in assessing a financial institution's capital adequacy. 6' The regulations promulgated by the OCC and OTS recognize that default risk is not
determined by the relative split between debt and equity in the
capital structure; rather, it is determined by the credit risk and

256. Id.
257. Id.
258. 12 C.F.R. § 910.1 (1989).
259. Id.
260. 12 C.F.R. § 3, 567.2 (1990).
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interest rate risk associated with asset deployment.' G' In contrast, the Bank System's use of a forty-four year old
debt-to-equity ratio does not appear to be a reliable measure of
default risk and the Banks have suggested that the leverage
ratio be increased or replaced with a more financially sophisticated risk-based capital measure of default risk.262
The proposal to amend the leverage ratio comes at an
interesting time in the Banks' history as mixed-ownership government corporations, also referred to as government- sponsored enterprises (GSEs). GSEs, generally, carry out functions
of public concern in a manner that does not have a direct
impact on the federal government's budget. The Banks' public
function is to promote the government's goal of supplying
economical housing finance.
Due to the proliferation of capital market financing by
GSEs, Congress required both the Treasury Department and
the Comptroller General of the United States (GAO) to conduct studies of GSEs, which include, among others, the Banks,
the Federal National Mortgage Association, the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation and the Farm Credit System. The
GAO study was to focus on the risks undertaken by all GSEs
and to ascertain the appropriate level of capital for such enterprises.26 3 The Treasury studies are to be conducted
will focus on the finansemi-annually on an ongoing basis and
2 4
6
GSEs.
of
soundness
and
cial safety
The final draft of the first Treasury study cited the Banks
as conservatively managed institutions, subject to minimal credit and interest rate risk. 265 (Only one of the Banks was the
subject of adverse comments due to interest rate risk brought
about by the rapid changes in that Bank's balance sheet. The
RTC has liquidated many insolvent institutions in this Bank's
district.) Indeed, the second Treasury study of GSEs' reported
data indicated that, on average, the Banks were the
best-capitalized of all the major providers of mortgage credit

261.

Id.

262.

Letter fi'ont "lhurnial

Mary K.
263.
264.
265.
SORED

C. Coiiell, Chairnan, Bank Presidents' Cancus to

Bush, Managing l)irector, Ie(deral Housing Finance Board (May I, 1990).
FIRREA § 1004; 103 Star. 183, 509-11 (1989).
Id. § 1404; 103 Star. 551-53.
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including not only GSEs' but also private financial institutions.2 6 A study prepared by Standard & Poor's, appended
to the Treasury Report, assigned a credit rating to each of the
GSEs'; the Banks as a whole and the Student Loan Marketing
Association received the highest available credit rating of
"AAA." Other GSEs received lower credit ratings.6 7 Currently, all GSEs receive a triple-A rating, notwithstanding their
capital positions, due to a perceived "moral obligation" of the
government to support the GSEs' debt issuances. 26 8 It is

widely believed that the Bank System would receive a triple- A
rating, absent any implicit government guarantee. However,
not all of the Banks are currently rated by the rating agencies,
and the ability of certain of the Banks (given minimal advance
demand and declining membership) to obtain this rating is uncertain.
In spite of the critical national focus on the
undercapitalization of most GSEs, the favorable findings of
these studies with respect to the Banks may add support to the
proposal to amend the twelve-to-one leverage ratio and permit
the Banks to leverage their capital further.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For almost sixty years, the Banks have successfully fulfilled
their housing finance mission. In the present environment,
however, the Banks will be challenged to demonstrate that they
should continue to play an integral role in providing housing
financing for this nation. The recent success of the initial offerings of Affordable Housing Program funds should provide'
support for the Banks' continued housing finance role.2 69
Nevertheless, given the legislated taking of the Banks' retained
earnings and the FIRREA-imposed burdens on current earnings, some members have begun to express concern about the

266. See
REPORT
OF
1ISECRETARY
OF
THE
TREASURY,
GOVERN MENT-S PONSORI'I) ENIERI'PRISF S, Chart 2, at 12 (Apr. 1991).
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267. Id. at A-18, A-46.
268. MOODY'S SOVEREIGN CREDIT REPORT, Fannie Mae (Jan. 1990); MOODY'S
BANK CREDIT REPORT, Freddie Mac (Oct. 1989); MOODY'S SOVEREIGN CREDIT REPORT, Federal Farm Credil I'aitks (Oct. 1989).

269. As previously noted, the 1990 allocatiotn of funds for the Affordable
Housitg Prograin was $78.8 millioii which helped create affordable housing valted
at $1.2 billion. TREASURY DEIP.IARTMENT STUDY, supra note 3, at XV-10.
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continued value of their investment in the Banks. 27' However, testimony of the Secretary of Treasury has indicated that
the Banks would not be a source of further funds for the thrift
27
bail-out. '

Although FIRREA provides a five-year moratorium on exit
from the SAIF, -72 thus ensuring mandatory Bank membership for at least federal savings institutions until August 9,
1994, it is likely that, upon expiration of the moratorium, a
number of savings institutions will convert from thrift charters
to bank charters, or to insurance under the BIF. Such institutions will retain Bank membership only if such membership
provides value to them. Thus, the Federal Home Loan Bank
System must devise ways to enhance the value of Bank membership if it is to continue to play a leading role in housing
finance in the future.

270. See supra text accompanying notes 87-89.
271. I-learings Before the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affails,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1990) (staienient of Secretary Nicholas F. Brady on
behalf of the Oversight Board of the RTC).
272. 12 U.S.C. § 1815(d)(2)(A)(ii) (West Stipp. 1990).

